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THE LAW IN RELATION TO CROPS-FRUCTUS
- INDUSTRIALES.
It is well known that a fundamental distinction is taken
between fruits, produced by the annual labor of man in
sowing and reaping, mowing and cultivating, and such as
constitute the natural growth of the soil. That corn, wheat,
oats, barley, potatoes, etc., being fnctus industriales, are
considered as the representatives of the labor and expense
bestowed upon them, and regarded as chattels; while grass,
trees, fruit on trees, etc., being fructus naturales, are, in
contemplation of law, a part of the soil of which they are
the natural growth.
This distinction was fully and clearly taken in the noted
and leading case of Evans v. Roberts., The facts in that
case were that a verbal contract had been made for the sale
of potatoes not yet dug, and the objection was made that
the agreement was void, on the ground that it was a contract
of sale of an interest in or concerning land, within the
meaning of the Statute of Frauds. The objection, however,
was not sustained, and Mr. Justice Bayley distinguished the
case of Crosby v. Wadsworth,2 which involved the sale of
growing grass. He said: "In that case the contract was
for the growing grass, which- is the natural and permanent
produce of the land, renewed from time to time without
cultivation. Now, growing grass does not come within the
description of goods and chattels, and cannot be seized as
such under a fierifacias; it goes to the heir, and not to the
executor; but growing potatoes come within the description
of emblements, and are deemed chattels by reason of their
being raised by labor and manurance. They go to the
executor of tenant in fee simple, although they are fixed to
the freehold,3 and may be taken in execution under a fieti
1 5 Barn. & Cress. 836. 2 6 East, 602. 3 Com. Dig. tit. Biens, G.
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facias by which the sheriff is commanded to levy the debt
of the goods and chattels of the defendant." This case
was decided in 1826, and established the doctrine that a
contract of sale of frictus industriales was not a contract
of sale of any interest in or concerning land, within the
meaning of the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds.
But the distinction, so clearly and satisfactorily stated in
the case we have considered, is one that was taken in
the earliest times. It was stated by Chief Justice Hobart,
in the early and oft-quoted case of Grantham v. Hawley,
(13 Jac. Rol. 313), and his language shows that the
distinction was then well known between the "natural
fruits,-as of grass or hay, which run merely with the
land,"-and the fructus industriales, adding that corn is
"fructus industriales; so that he that sows it may seem
to have a kind of property ip~so facto in it divided from
the land, and therefore the executor shall have it, and
not the heirs." The case of Evans v. Roberts is therefore
not important as taking for the first time the distinction
between fructus naturales and fructus industriales, but it has
nevertheless been considered as of the greatest importance,
as establishing the doctrine that a sale of fructus industriales
is not a sale of an interest in land, within the meaning
of the Statute of Frauds. Upon the authority of that case
that doctrine has been generally recognized and adopted,
both in England, in Ireland, and in this country.2  While,
on the other hand, a contract for the sale of growing crops,
fructus naturales, is governed by the fourth section of the
Statute of Frauds, if it provides for vesting an interest in
Slob. 132.
2 Jones v. Flint, io Ad. & E. 753; Dunne v. Ferguson, x Hayes, 54r;
vVhipple v. Foote, 2 Johns. 422; Stewart v. Doughty, 9 Johns. ix2; Austin
v. Sawyer, 9 Cow. 39; Cutler v. Pope, 13 Me. 377; Bryant v. Crosby, 40
Me. 9, 21; Buck v. Pickwell, 27 Vt. 157; Ross v. Welch, ix Gray, 235;
Kingsley v. Holbrook, 45 N. H. 313, 318; Howe v. Batchelder, 49 N. H.
204, 208; Marshall v. Ferguson, 23 Cal. 65; Purner v,. Piercy, 40 Md. 212;
Davis v. McFarlane, 37 Cal. 634; Bernal v,. Hovious, 17 Cal. 541; Graff v,.
Fitch, 58 Ill. 377; Bull v. Griswold, 19 Ill. 631; Bellows v. 'Wells, 36 Vt.
6oo; Carson v,. Browder, 2 Lea, 701.
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the vendee before a severance of the crops from the soil.,
As to the distinction between fietus naturales andfructus
industriales, it is to be remarked that a growing crop of
grass, even if grown from the seed, cannot be regarded as
fructus industriales, for this reason: that it cannot be dis-
tinguished from the natural product.2 Of course, when the
agreement is for the sale of an interest in lands, under that
section of the Statute of Frauds it is necessary that the
agreement, "or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be
in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith,
or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized."
On the other hand, if the agreement for the sale of fructis
industriales is an agreement for the sale of "goods, wares,
and merchandise," within the meaning of the seventeenth
section of that statute, then it is necessary that the agree-
ment should be in writing if the value is over-a specified
amount, unless there has been a payment made or an
acceptance of a part of the goods.3
The general rule is, that while as between vendor and
vendee, and as against strangers and trespassers, the title to
personal property passes without delivery, yet as against
subsequent purchasers and attaching creditors an actual or
constructive delivery is essential to the validity of the sale.4
But while the general policy of the law will not permit
the owner of personal property to sell it, and still continue
in possession of it, it is necessary that the rule be somewhat
modified in the case of a sale of growing crops. To require
the purchaser of growing crops to take manual possession of
them before the time to harvest comes, would be to practi-
Rodwell v. Phillips, 9 Mee. &*W. 502; Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East,
602; Campbell v. Roots, 2 Mee. & W. 248.
2 Reiff v. Reiff, 64 Pa. St. 134. And see I Will. on Ex'rs, 783.
3 Benj. on Sales, sect. 114.
4 Ludwig v. Fuller, 17 Me. 162; Vining v. Gilbreth, 39 Me. 496; Fair-
field Bridge Co. v. Nye, 6o Me. 372; Packard v. West, 4 Gray, 307; Mt.
Hope Iron Co. v. Buffington, xo3 Mass. 62; Thorndike v. Bath, 114 Mass.
r I6; Haak v. Linderman, 64 Pa. St. 499; Ticknor v. McClelland, 84 Ill. 471,
474; Webster v. Granger, 78 Ill. 230; Lewis v. Swift, 54 Ill. 436; Morgan
v. Taylor, 32 Texas, 363.
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cally deny the right of the owner to sell such crops until
harvest time. The latest case we have been able to find in
which this question has been considered is the case of Tick-
nor v. McClelland," decided in the Supreme Court of Illinois.
In that case there had been a sale of standing corn, which
was afterwards levied on as the property of the vendor and
sold at execution sale. But the court held that 41 case of
the sale of standing crops, the possession is in the vendee
until it is time to harvest them, and that until then he is not
required to take manual possession of them. Such is un-
doubtedly the proper view to take of this question, so far as
the validity of the sale is concerned. Strictly speaking,
however, we doubt the correctness of saying that the pos-
session is in the vendee. "We know of no rule or principle
of law by which the possession of a crop growing upon land
can be separated from the land, so as to place the possession
of the land in one, and the crop in another. The crop while
growing is attached to and composes part of the land, and
must necessarily be in the possession of whomsoever the
land is possessed." 2 Instead of declaring that the posses-
sion is in the vendee, it would be better to say that the pos-
session is in the vendor in trust for the vendee, and that the
rule that there must be a change of possession does not ex-
tend to property which is not susceptible of delivery as a
growing crop.3 In a case in Maine, it was held that a pur-
chase of growing crops, though paid for, would pass no
title against the creditors of the vendee until possession or
delivery was had, and that unless such possession and de-
livery was had prior to the death of the vendor, and to the
issuing of a commission of insolvency upon his estate, the title
would be in the administrator in trust for creditors.4 The
purchaser of a growing crop, whether at private or at execu-
tion sale, has of course a right to enter upon the premises to
* 84 Ill. 471.
* Foster v. Fletcher, 7 T. B. Mon. 534; s. c., x8 Am. Dec. 2oS.
3 See Robbins v. Oldham, i Duv. 28; Cummings v. Griggs, z Duv. 87;
Morton v. Ragan, 5 Bush, 334; Bellows v. Wells, 36 Vt. 602.
4 Stone v. Peacock, 35 Me. 385.
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gather the crop.' The purchaser of a growing crop is not
only entitled to a reasonable time after the crop matures in
which to gather it, but to a reasonable time after notice given
to him by the vendor. So that an instruction that unless a
purchaser of a crop of corn gathered it within a reasonable
time after maturity, the owner of the field could turn in his
cattle without responding to his vendee for the damage suf-
fered by the destruction of the crop, was held erroneous.2
Property not in being could not be the subject of a valid
mortgage at common law, and a mortgage of an unplanted
crop has, therefore, generally been held void *at law.3 But in
equity, the rule was that the lien attached as soon as the
subject of the mortgage came into existence, and was en-
forced against the mortgagor and those holding under him
with notice.4 In a case in Illinois it was said: -
"There is some conflict in the authorities, but we think
the reason and common sense of the thing is, the crop of,
wheat, corn, and oats, the seed for which even might not'
have been in existence when the mortgage was made, and
was not put into the ground until the spring of I878, had no
potential existence on the third day of January, 1877, at.
which time the mortgagor had no idea, in all probability, as
to the particular parts of land he would put into this or that
crop, or how much of it, if any, he would cultivate for 'any
particular crop. Such crops,fructus iizdustriales, are entirely
I Davidson v. Waldron, 3r Ill. 120; Stewart v,. Doughty, 9 Johns. ioS,
12 Whipple v. Foot, 2 Johns. 423.
2 Ogden v. Lucas, 48 Ill. 492.
3 Tomlinson v. Greenfield, 31 Ark. 558; Cressey v. Cressey, 17 Hun,
120; Milliman v. Neher, 20 Barb. 37; Otis v. Sill, 8 Barb. o2; McCaffrey
v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 459; Vinson v. Hallowell, io Bush, 538; Hutchinson
v. Ford, 9 Bush, 318; Ross v. Wilson, 7 Bush, 29; Stowell v. Bair, 5 Bradw.
104; Comstock v. Scales, 7 Wis. 559; Redd v. Burrus, 58 Ga. 574; Bank of
Lansingburgh v. Crary, i Barb. 542, 551; Gettings v. Nelson, 86 Ill. 593;
Butt v. Ellett, i9 Wall. 544; Cayce v. Stovall, 50 Miss. 396. And see Cud-
worth v. Scott, 41 N. H. 456.
4 Apperson v. Moore, 30 Ark. 56; Butt v. Ellett, ig Wall. 544; White
v. Thomas, 52 Miss. 49; Everman v. Robb. 52 Miss. 653, 662; Sellers v.
Lester, 48 Miss. 513; Mitchell v. Winslow, 2 Story, 631; Ellett v. Butt, x
Woods, 214, 218.
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distinguishable from those of fields already in grass for hay,
fruit orchards, etc., planted and in bearing condition, the prod-
ucts of which are fnictus naturales; for, as to the former, it de-
pends upon the will, determination, labor, and industry of the
farmer, when or how they exist at all, and when produced,
as in this case, they are after-acquired property, while the
latter class have their roots- the living agencies -already
in the soil, and, being perennial, they are dependent only on
the succession of the seasons for their growth and maturity..
Therefore, the law regards them as having a potential exist-
ence, even before they commence to grow in the form of the
product. But the crops in this case, the seeds for which
were not put into the ground until fifteen months after the
mortgage, can no more properly be regarded as having a
potential existence in the soil at the time of the mortgage
than does the unbuilt ship in the timbers of the forest, or
boots and shoes in the skins of the living herd."x There
are, however, cases whic h declare that a mortgage of an un-
planted crop made by one in possession of the land will be
held valid at law;, and a distinguished writer even lays it
down that such a mortgage "is generally regarded as valid
at law." 2 But we think the statement that it is generally so
regarded can hardly be sustained. We think the weight of
authority is against its validity at law. But whether the
mortgage is to be considered as valid at law or not, it is cer-
tain that if the mortgagee takes possession under the mort-
gage when the crops come into existence, his rights will be
recognized and maintained in the courts of law. For while
the mortgage may not have conveyed any legal title to the
property, yet it was a valid license to enter and seize the
property as soon as it was acquired or came into existence;
and after such entry title vested in the mortgagee even at
law. Licet dispositio de interesse fiduro sit inutilis, tamen
' Stowell v. Bair, 5 Bradw. lo7, ioS, per McAllister, J.
2 Jones on Chattel Mort., sect. 143; Arques v. Wasson, 51 Cal 620; Rob-
inson v. Ezzell, 72 N. C. 231; Thrash v. Bennett, 57 Ala. 161; Van Hoozer
v. Cory, 34 Barb. 9, 12; Conderman v. Smith, 41 Barb. 404; Emerson v.
Eastport, etc., R. Co., 67 Me. 387, 392; Farrar v. Smith, 64 Me. 74, 77.
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potese fieri declaratio precedere qua sortiatur effectum inter-
veniente novo actu.
As expressed by Mr. Commissioner Dwight: "The gen-
eral idea running through these cases in a court of law,
appears to be that the executory agreement operates as a
license, authority, or power, revocable in its nature, until the
creditor is either put into possession of the goods at the
time, or after they come into existence, or are vested in the
debtor. As soon as that new act has intervened, the lien of
the creditor becomes perfect, and in the absence of statutory
regulation, prevails over the liens of subsequent execu-
tions."' And as between mortgagor and mortgagee, the
mortgagor cannot recover from the mortgagee the property
thus taken possession of. Having enjoyed the cohsidera-
tion, he will not be allowed to repudiate the agreement under
which he obtained it, but will be estopped from maintaining
an action for the property.2
It may be noted, however, in this connection, that it has
been held that the lessor of land may stipulate in a lease
that the crops grown on the premises shall remain the prop-
erty of the lessor until the rent is paid. That such a stipu-
lation will be upheld as between the parties and third
persons. 3 It is conceded in these cases that the sale of a
thing not in existence is inoperative, but it is insisted that
when the thing thereafter to be produced is the produce of
land, the owner of the land may retain the general property
of the thing produced, unless there is some fraud in the con-
tract.
A valid mortgage may be made of a part of a growing
crop if the part so mortgaged is so described as to be capa-
ble of identification. Thus it has been held by the Supreme
Court of Georgia that a mortgage, made in May, of six bales
of cotton growing and being grown and produced on a des-
McCaffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 463. And see Congreve v. Evetts, io
Exch. 298; Carr v. Allatt, 3 Hurl. & N. 964.
2 Moore v. Byrum, 1O S. C. (N. S.) 462, 463.
3 Bellows v. Wells, 36 Vt. 6oi; Gray v'. Stevens, 28 Vt. z; Briggs v. Oaks,
26 Vt. 138; Smith v. Atkins, z8 VL 461; Lewis v. Lyman, 22 Pick. 437;
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ignated plantation cultivated by the mortgagor, such bales
to average a certain designated weight, to be covered with
bagging and bound with iron ties, and delivered at a certain
warehouse on or before the fifteenth day of October follow-
ing, was sufficiently specific in the description of property
mortgaged, and that the mortgagee could prove that the
mortgagor severed *such cotton from the rest of the crop,
and delivered it at the warehouse according to his agree-
ment.' But it has been held that a mortgage of so much
cotton as will make'two bales, each to be of a certain weight,
is void on the ground that no definite part of the crop was
mortgaged.2 A mortgage of growing crops, executed,
acknowledged, and recorded in due form, is valid as against
third parties without delivery of possession of the property
mortgaged; but it is held that the lien of such mortgage
ceases as against subsequent purchasers, after the crop is
harvested, unless when harvested it is delivered to the mort-
gagee. 3 But it has been held that a chattel mortgage upon
a growing crop, as against an attaching creditor, continues
to be a lien on the crop, in possession of the mortgagor,
after severance and removal from the land.4
A landlord has no such interest in crops grown on rented
lands as can be made the subject of a valid mortgage.s
And a mortgage of crops by one who is cultivating the
farm upon shares covers only his share.6 A crop being a
chattel interest, the mortgage of it should, of course, be
recorded as a chattel mortgage. 7
In England, the legal mortgagee of real property is entitled
to enter immediately after the execution of the mortgage,
by virtue of the estate thereby vested in him.8 And so. long
as he abstains from taking possession, the mortgagor is not
Stephens v. Tucker, 55 Ga. 543.
2 Williamson v. Steele, 3 Lea, 527. And see Thurman v. Jenkins, 2 Baxt.
426.
3 Quiriaque v. Dennis, 24 Cal. 154; Goodyear v. Williston, 42 Cal. ix.
4 Rider v. Edgar, 54 Cal. 127. 5 Broughton v. Powell, 52 Ala. 123.
6 McGee v. Fitzer, 37 Texas, 27. 7 1 Jones on Mort., sect. 151.
8 1 Fish. L. of Mort., sect. 75.
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bound to account to him for the rents and profits, and the
mortgagee is not entitled to the growing crops which have
been removed by the mortgagor between the date of the
mortgage and the recovery of possession, unless he can
claim them as emblements under an express contract of
tenancy., But he has a right to all crops growing on the
premises when he takes possession.' In this country, on
the other hand, the rule is that the legal estate is in the
mortgagor until foreclosure of the mortgage, upon default
being made, and the growing crops pass* with the soil to the
purchaser under the foreclosure deed.3
It is to be noted, however, that in Ohio a different rule
was laid down from that which has been elsewhere recog-
nized. While it was conceded that on a sale of realty the
crops would pass to the grantee, in the absence of a reser-
vation thereof, yet that the' doctrine did not apply to judicial
sales when conducted under their system of appraisements.
"Between a mortgagor and mortgagee, a mortgagor in
possession is a tenant at will," said the court, "and if the
emblements are not protected in his hands, it is because he
may obtain their value in account on bill to redeem. But
he may lawfully lease, subject to the mortgage; and when
the mortgagee defeats the estate, either by entry or judicial
sale, the annual crops are saved for the tenant, under the
common rule relating to emblements, because the term
of the lease is uncertain." 4 This, of course, cannot be
regarded as law outside the State of Ohio. Not only does
the purchaser take the crop, but it has even been held that,
as between the mortgagee of land who purchases at the
foreclosure sale, and the execution creditors of the mort-
gagor in possession, the former is entitled to the growing
2 Fish. L. of Mort., sect. 1491.
2 Ibid. Ex parte Temple, i G. & J. 216.
3 Jones v. Thomas, 8 Blackf. 428; Scriven v. Moote, 36 Mich. 64; 'Ruggles
v. First National Bank, 43 Mich. 192; Gossom v. Donaldson, 18 B. Mon. 230;
Bank of United States v. Voorhees, r McLean, 221 ; Gray v. Brignardello, i
Wall. 634; Lane v. King, 8 Wend. 584; Aldrich v. Reynolds, i Barb. Ch.
613; Ledyard v. Phillips, 13 Rep. 595.
4 Cassilly v. Rhodes, 12 Ohio, 88.
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crops.r As the rule is that the crops pass with the soil, it
has been said that on proper application the court may
provide for their preservation until possession is given to
the purchaser.2 The confirmation of a foreclosure sale, cov-
ering growing crops, relates back to the time of sale, and
entitles the purchaser to control the crops from that time,
if no equities prevent, and after due notice has been given
to interested parties.3
It has been held by the Supreme Court of California that
where a debtor gives to his creditor the possession of a
growing crop, under an agreement that such creditor shall
harvest it and apply the proceeds to the payment of the
debt, the creditor thereby obtains a lien on the crop superior
to the lien acquired by another creditor to whom the debtor
gave a mortgage on the crop after the first creditor had
taken possession, and with notice of the rights of the first
creditor.4
Laborers on a farm have no lien on the crop produced
for their wages. The Supreme Court of Tennessee was, not
long since, called on to pass on this question, and the law
was declared as we have stated it. "If we should decide,"
said the court, "that the farm laborer has a lien on the crop,
or is entitled out of the proceeds of the crop to be paid for
his services, to the exclusion of all other demands until he
is paid, it would bejus dare, notjits dicere." 5o
In Louisiana, however, the law has secured to the laborers
a lien on the crops, and it has a preference over the lien
secured to the landlord.6
It is held, in a recent case in Florida, that a vendor
of land has not, by virtue of his lien for the unpaid pur-
chase-money, any lien on the crops grown on the land.
This doctrine is announced in a recent case in Florida,
where the question was whether a vendor had such an
1 Crews v. Pendleton, I Leigh, 297; s. . 19 Am. Dec. 750.
2 Ruggles v. First National Bank, 43 Mich. 192.
3 Ibid. 4 Lovensohn v. Ward, 45 Cal. 8.
5 Hunt v. Wing, 57 Tenn. (io Heisk.).s 3 9 , 149.
6 Duplantier v. Wilkins, 19 La. An. 112.
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equitable lien upon the crops, by virtue of his right to
charge the land for his purchase-money, as would give him
a preference over a subsequent bonafide mortgage-creditor
with or without notice of the lien on the land., So, mere
ownership of the land confers no right to possess and dis-
pose of the crop raised thereon by tenants. The landlord's
right to rent must be asserted and perfected in accordance
with and under the provisions of law.2 At the common
law, as is well known, the landlord had a right to charge
the goods of the tenant remaining on the premises for his
rent, But this right of distress, at the ancient common law,,
did not extend to growing crops.S But by the statute ii
Geo. II., c. 19, landlords were empowered to distrain growing
crops on the estate demised, and to cut and gather them
when ripe. And in Massachusetts the courts have held,
that while goods that could .not be returned in the same
plight in which they were taken could not be distrained,4
yet that corn or other annual product of the soil, if ripe and
fit for harvest, could be cut down and attached.5 While,
independent of statutes the landlord has no lien on the
crops, 6 yet such a lien has been secured to him by statutory
provision in many of the States. He has such lien in
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Texas, and possibly
elsewhere.7 A material distinction, and one of great im-
portance, exists between the right to levy a distress on the
crop, and the statutory lien thereon. The right to distrain
I Wooten v. Bellinger, 17 Fla. 289. 2 Robinson v. Kruse, 29 Ark. 575.
3 i Roll. Abr. 666; Co. Lit. 47 b. 4 Bond v. Ward, 7 Mass. 123.
5 Penhallow v. Dwight, 7 Mass. 34; Heard v. Fairbanks, 5 Metc. iii.
6 Loomis v. Lincoln, 24 Vt. 153; Doty v. Heth, 52 Miss. 530, 536; Ar-
buckle v. Nems, 5o Miss. 556.
7 Alabama Code (1876), p. 785, sects. 3474, 3477; Sevier v. Shaw, 25 Ark.
6o9; Georgia Code (1873), P. 344, sect. 1977; Illinois Rev. Stats., vol. i,
p. 66r, sect. 3i; Indiana Rev. Stats. (I88i), sect. 5224; Kansas Gen. Stats.
(1868), p. 542, sect. 24; Kentucky Gen. Stats. (1873), pp. 6o4, 6o8, sects.
1, 13; Maryland Rev. Code (1878), p. 7o6, sect. 14; Mississippi Rev. Code
(88o), sect. 1301; Missouri Rev. Stats. (1879), yol. x, p. Vi6, sect. 3083;
Texas Rev. Stats. (1879), p. 45o, art. 3107.
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was limited, and could only be exercised on the goods or
property of the tenant so long as such property continued
to be on the demised premises. The right was lost if not
exercised before the expiration of the term. On the other
hand, the statutory lien of the landlord is not impaired by
an expiration of the term or the removal of the crops. It
continues until the crop passes into the possession of a pur-
chaser without notice., If the crops pass to one with notice,
and he sells them, an action on the case can be maintained
against him.2 The crops being on the place owned by the
landlord is notice to. all the world of the relation between
him and his tenant, and of his lien.3 His lien is paramount 4
and has priority over a mortgage of the crops,5 and can be
enforced by attachment.6 But the lien of the landlord con-
fers on him no title to the crops which would authorize him
to bring an action of trover for them against one who should
convert them to his own use.7 And when there are separate
contracts of renting, the landlord's lien extends to the crop
grown on each of the parcels of land, but only for the rent
of such parcel.8
When provisi6n is made in a lease of a farm that the crops
shall be holden for the rent and be at the disposal of the
lessor, in the same manner as if he were in the actual occu-
pation of the farm, as against subsequent purchasers and
creditors of the lessee, they remain the property of the lessee
until the lessor takes actual possession of the same.9 If the
lease is of such a character, however, that the lessor and
lessee are tenants in common, then it would not be neces-
sary that there should have been a delivery of the crop to
the lessor.1° But where the statute gives to the landlord a
' Lomax v. Le Grand, 6o Ala. 537; Governor v. Davis, 20 Ala. 366.
' Hussey v'. Peebles, 53 Ala. 432. See, too, Neifert v. Ames, 26 Kan. 515.
3 Lomax v. Le Grand, supra. 4 Atkins v. Womeldorf, 53 Iowa, 150.
5 Sevier v. Shaw, 25 Ark. 6o9.
6 Rotzler v,. Rotzler, 46 Iowa, i89; Crawford v. Coil, 69 Mo. 588; Hub-
bard v. Moss, 65 Mo. 647.
7 Folmar v. Copeland, 57 Ala. 5S8. 8 Nelson v. Webb, 54 Ala. 436.
9 Butterfield v,. Baker, 5 Pick. 522; Munsell a'. Carew, 2 Cush. 5o.
10 Beaumont v. Crane, 14 Mass. 4oo.
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lien on crops grown on the premises in any year for the ac-
cruing rent, it is held to be not necessary that the landlord
should obtain an attachment against the property and that
the courts will enjoin the removal or disposition of the crop
while the lien continues.!
It being settled that a crop, whether growing or standing
in the field ready to be harvested, is no part of the realty,
but personal estate, it follows that such crops are liable to be
seized on execution, and to be sold as other personal estate.
2
And such was the common-law rule.3 But in Adams v.
Turner,4 the Supreme Court of Alabama, in 1843, evidently
doubted whether an immature crop could be talken on exe-
cution at common law, but without determining the point.
It was then held, however, that if the right existed at com-
mon law, it did not exist in ,Alabama, wvhere the statute pro-
vided it should not be lawful to levy an execution on'crops
until the crop was gathered. "The idea that the lien at-
tached," said the court, " upon the planted crop as soon as
the execution was delivered to the sheriff, though the right
to levy it was postponed until a severance took place, is
attempted to be deduced from the last words of the section
cited, viz.: 'until the crop is gathered.' These words ca'n-
not, upon any just principles of construction, be regarded
so potent as to give to an execution a retrospective effect.
They do not refer to the lien, if they did they would post-
pone it until the crop was gathered; but it is the levy they
relate to and postpone until that event takes place." The
lien and the right to levy were said to be so intimately con-
nected, that if the latter was taken away or suspended, it
amounted to a destruction of the former. This ruling was
affirmed in 1852,5 but at a later period the common-law rule
Price v. Roetzell, 56 Mo. 500.
2 Smith v. Tritt, i Dev. & B. 241; Shannon v. Jones, 12 Ired. 2o6;
Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bland, 3 1; McKenzie v. Lampley, 3r Ala. 526; Hart-
well v. Bissell, 17 Johns. 128; Shepard v. Philbrick, 2 Denio, 175; Stewart
v. Doughty, 9 Johns. soB; Parham v. Thompson, 2 J. J. Marsh, 159; Whip-
ple v. Foot, 2 Johns. 422; Patapsco v. Magee, 86 N. C. 350.
3 Poole's Case, I Salk. 368; Scorell v. Boxall, z Y. & J. 398.
4 5 Ala. 744- 5 Evans v. Lamar, 21 Ala. 333.
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prevailed., It may be remarked, too, that growing crops
may. be sold as personalty on execution, although the land
is mortgaged.2 It has been held in a case recently decided
in Illinois that, while as between the parties to a judgment,
the seizure and sale of growing crops, on execution issued
on the judgment, constitutes a severance from the realty,
yet as respects the grantee in a deed of trust given by the
execution-debtor before the execution became a lien, such
seizure and sale will not work a severance. The purchaser
at the sheriff's sale will take subject to the rights of the
grantee in the trust deed.3 Under the laws of Kentucky, a
growing crop is not subject to execution.4
The question has been raised whether an action of re-
plevin may be maintained for the carrying away of crops.
In De Mott v. Hagerman,5 decided in the Supreme Court of
New York in 1828, it was held that where one enters and
ousts the owner of land, continues in possession, and cuts
and removes the crops, though they were sown by the
owner, yet replevin will not lie for crops removed. "If the
entry was lawful, the property of the wheat and rye was in
the defendants. If it was unlawful and worked a disseisin,
trespass quare clausum fregit, might have been maintained
for the first entry, and after a recovery in ejectment, dam-
ages would follow for the mesne profits. But I do not see
how the parties can maintain an action for the wheat and
rye raised, disconnected from the remedy by 'trespass. If
that be allowable, a plaintiff may sue in trover for wheat or
corn raised on land of which he has been disseised, and that,
too, before his re-entry. The action of replevin does not lie
in such a case." But, as is pointed out by the Supreme
Court of Indiana, in Rowell v. Klein,6 decided in 1873, that
decision was rendered when much importance was attached
to the form rather than to the substance of the action, and
x McKenzie v,. Lampley, 31 Ala. 526. 2 Preston v. Ryan, 45 Mich. 174.
3 Anderson v'. Strauss, 98 Ill. 485.
4 Blincoe v,. Lee, iz Bush, 358; Brewer v,. Crosby, 8 Bush, 388; Morton
a,. Ragan, 5 Bush, 334.
5 8 Cow. 220. 6 44 Ind. 296.
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was based on a misconception of form. "The ruling in the
above case," said the court, "is technical and presents a de-
gree of nicety not recognized by many very high authorities.z
We believe it was always the rule that, when trespass
would lie for the severing from the realty of that which by
the severance became personalty, replevin would lie for the
recovery of such personalty, and that trespass could be
maintained in any and all cases where the plaintiff had the
right of property, and also the right of immediate posses-
sion, although the actual possession was in another."
In Missouri, the court has ruled that replevin will not lie
for a certain number of bushels of corn, the crop standing
ungathered in the field.2 But ii a case subsequently de-
cided in the same court, it was held that corn in the stalk
was the subject of replevin, and that without regard to
whether it was growing or not.3 We think there can be no
doubt but that replevin may be maintained for crops wrong-
fully severed and carried away.4 And it is equally clear and
well established that replevin will not lie at common law, by
one out of possession of the realty against one in possession,
under claim of title, for chattels which have become such by
severance from the realty.5 So, it has been h'eld that trover
would not lie for stone and gravel, the defendant being in
possession and claiming adversely,6 and that an action would
not lie for money had and received under the circumstances.7
The reason assigned .was that the right to the land was the
foundation of the action, and that it was not in the power of
a party to change a local into a transitory action.
When the occupant of land, whether possessed of an
I Waterman v. Matteson, 4 R. I. 539; 1 Chitty P1. 149, and note i; Nel-
son v. Burt, I5 Mass. 204; The People v. Alberty, ix Wend. 16i; Schermer-
horn v. Buell, 4 Denio, 422; Haythorn v. Rushforth, 4 Harrison, 16o; Ely v.
Ehile, 3 N. V. 5o6.
2 Jones v. Dodge, 61 Mo. 368. 3 Garth v. Caldwell, 72 Mo. 622.
4 See Wells on Replevin, sect. 74; Jarratt v. McDaniel, 32 Ark. 604.
5 Renwick v. Boyd (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Feb. 20, i882), 13
Reporter, 571. And see Brown v. Caldwell, 5o Serg. & R. 114.
6 Mather v. Trinity Church, 3 Serg. & R. 509.
7 Baker v. Howell, 6 Serg. & R. 476.
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estate in fee simple or of an estate determining with his
own life, has planted a crop and died before it has been
harvested, the rule at common law was, that as between the
executor and the heirs at law, the crop went to the executor
as compensation for the expense incurred in getting the
land ready for the crop -the tilling, manuring, and sowing
the land., But the rule was different as between the exec-
utor and the devisee of the land. As between them the
crop goes to the devisee.2 The rule does not hold, how-
ever, if a contrary intention has been manifested by the
testator.3 In this connection it may be interesting to read
the language of Mr. Justice Walton, of the Supreme Court
of Maine, in a recent case in that court.4 After noticing
the fact that the common-law rule had been changed in
some of the States by statute, he says: "We are inclined
to think the law is best as it is; that, although the rule
which gives to the devisee of the land the unharvested
crops, and denies them to the heir at law, may seem to be
unphilosophical, it is nevertheless founded in practical wis-
dom. Not unfrequently the heirs at law are mere children,
without discretion of their own to enable them to care for
the growing crops, and without legal guardians to aid
them. They are sometimes scattered and far away. The
death of the ancestor may be sudden, and the condition
z Fisher v. Forbes, 9 Vin. Abr. 373, tit. Emblements, pl. 82; Latham v.
Atwood, Cro. Car. 515; Gwin v. Hicks, i Bay, 503; Laurin v. McCall, 3
Strob. 21; Evans v. Inglehart, 6 Gill & J. 173; Singleton v. Singleton, 5
Dana, 92; Thornton v. Burch, 2o Ga. 791; Penhallow" v. Dwight, 7 Mass.
34; Wadsworth v. Allcott. 6 N. Y. 64.
2 Cro. Eliz. 61; Co. Lit., sect. 63, note 2; 4 Bac. Abr. (Bouvier's ed.) 83;
Bull. N. P. 34; Spencer's Case, Winch, 51; West v. Moore, 8 East, 339;
Cox v,. Godslave, 6 East, 604, note; Dennett v. Hopkinson, 63 Me. 353;
Hathorn v. Eaton, 70 Me. 219; Budd v. Hiler, 29 N. J. L. 43; Shofner v.
Shofner, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 94; Fetrow v. Fetrow, 50 Pa. St. 253; Pratt v.
Coffman, 27 Mo. 424; Carnagy v. Woodcock, 2 Munf. 234; Grubb's Appeal,
4 Yeates, 23; Creel v. Kirkham, 47 Ill. 344; Smith v. Barham, 2 Dev. Eq.
420; s. C., 25 Am. Dec. 72r.
3 Spencer's Case, I WinIch, 51; Cox v. Godslave, 6 East, 604, note;
Fetrow '. Fetrow, 50 Pa. St. 253; Pratt v,. Coffman, 27 Mo. 424; Shofner v,.
Shofner, 5 Sneed (Tenn.), 94.
4 Dennett v. Hopkirison, 63 Me. 350, 355.
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of his family such that the crops, unharvested as well as
harvested, may be needed for their immediate support.
Will it not be better, therefore, in the great majority of
cases, that all the crops, the unharvested as well as the
harvested, should be regarded as personal property, and go
to the administrator? We cannot resist the conviction that
it is better that it should be so. Not so, however, of a
devisee of the land. He is the selected object of a specific
donation. If, for any cause, it is probable that he will not
be in a condition to take charge of it at the donor's death,
the contingency can be provided in the will. It is a matter
which the testator would be likely to think of and provide
for if necessary. If there is no such provision, and the gift
is unconditional, without words of limitation or restraint, we
think it may fairly be presumed that it was the intention
of the donor that his donee should take the land as a
grantee would take it,- with the right to immediate pos-
session and the full enjoyment of all that is growing upon
it, as well the unsevered annual crops, as the more perma-
nent growth." It has been laid down that if A., seized in
fee, sows the land and devises to B. for life, remainder to C.
in fee, and dies before severance, (I) that the executor of A.
shall not have the emblements; (2) and that if B. dies before
severance, his executor shall not have them, but they shall
go to him in remainder; (3) but if the devise had been only
to B., and B. had died, then the executor of B. should have
had the emblements, though B. did not sow.'
By the common law the widow is entitled to the crops
growing, at the death of her husband, up On that part of the
homestead farm which is assigned to her by the heir for her
dower.2 And the reason assigned is that the wife is in de
optima possessione viri, -i.e., that she derives title and pos-
session directly from her husband, and therefore above the
title of the executor or heir. But the widow remaining in
possession of the mansion and plantation of her husband
z Co. Lit. 55 .
2 2 Inst. 81; Dyer, 36; Park on Dower, 355; Parker v. Parker, 17 Pick.
236; Catlin v. Ware, 9 Mass. 218.
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until her dower is assigned to her, is held not to be entitled
to the crops growing on the plantation at the time of the
death of her husband.! So, where dower has not been
assigned, and the widow continues in possession of the
mansion house and plantation under statutory provisions,
the rule is the same, and she is not entitled to the crops.2
And where a doweress in possession of land on which she
had sown a. crop of wheat, consented, in a suit for par-
tition, that her dower in the premises might be sold, and
the property was sold, and she received her share of the
proceeds of the sale, it was held that the growing crop
passed by the sale, and that she could not claim the same
as emblements, her estate having terminated by her own act
in consenting to the sale.3
As to tenants at will, it is laid down as follows in Little-
ton's Institutes: "If the lessee soweth the land, and the
lessor, after it is sowne and before the corne is ripe, put him
out, yet the lessee shall have the come, and shall have free
entry egress and regress to cut and carrie away the corne,
because he knew not at what time the lessor would enter upon
him." 4 The comment of Sir Edward Coke is: "The reason
of this is, for that the estate of the lessee is uncertaine,
and therefore, lest the ground should be unmanured, which
should be hurtfull to the commonwealth, he shall reape the
crop which he sowed in peace, albeit the lessor doth deter-
mine his wil before it be ripe. And so it is if he set rootes,
or sow hempe or flax, or any other annual profit, if, after the
same be planted, the lessor oust the lessee; or if the lessee
dieth, yet he or his executors shall have that yeare's crop.
But if he plant young fruit-trees or young oaks, ashes, elmes,
etc., or sow the ground with acornes, etc., then the lessor
may put him out notwithstanding, because they will yeeld
no present annual profit." From the earliest times to the
present, then, the law has been that where an estate is of an
Budd v. Hiler, 3 Dutch. 43.
2 Budd v. Hiler, sujlra; Whaley v. Whaley, 51 Mo. 36; Kain v. Fisher,
6 N. Y. 598.
3 Talbot v. Hill, 68 I1. xo6. 4 Lib. I., ch. 8, sect. 68.
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uncertain termination, and is suddenly concluded by the act
of God, or that of the lessor, the lessee or his legal repre-
sentatives may claim the emblements.' But the rule is
otherwise where the tenant's interest is to terminate at a
fixed time, or if he by his own act has brought. his lease to
an end.2 In such cases he is not allowed to claim the em-
blements, inasmuch as it is by his own folly that he has
sowed that which he could not reap. So, where a woman
held an estate in lands during her widowhood, and sowed
the land, and before severance married, it was held that the
crop belonged to the landlord of whom she held, and not
to her or to her husband.3 So, too, where the tenant for
life forfeits his estate by committing waste.4 And where a
minister of a church, entitled to the possession of the par-
sonage land, while in possession thereof sowed the land
with grain, then sold the growing crop, and voluntarily
ceased to be the minister of that church, and removed from
the parsonage land before the crop was harvested, it was
held that his vendee did not obtain such title as would
entitle him to maintain trover for the crop.S The sal6 could
not vest in the purchaser any greater right than wopld have
remained in the seller.
If the tenant at will was ousted before the crop was put
in, the rule at common law was that he could not recover
I Noy's Maxims, 51 ; x Cruise's Dig. tit. 9, Estate at Will, ch. i, sect. 12;
Graves v. Weld, 5 Barn. & Ad. o5; Weem's Exr. v. Bryan, 2z Ala. 302, 308;
Rising v. Stannard, 17 Mass. 287; Debow v. Titus, io N. J. L. 151, 153;
Davis v. Thompson, 13 Me. 209, 215; Comfort v. Duncan, i Miles, 229;
Kittredge v. Woods, 3 N. H. 503, 505; Davis v. Brocklebank, 9 N. H. 73;
Sherburne v. Jones, 20 Me. 70; Stewart z. Doughty, 9 Johns. xog, 12;
Bennett .v. Bennett, 34 Ala. 53; Brown v. Thurston, 56 Me. 126; Reilly v.
Ringland, 39 Iowa, io6; Burrowes v. Caines, 2 Upper Canada, Q. B. 228.
2 See the cases cited in the note above. Also Caldecott v. Smythies, 7
Car. & P. 8oS; Whitmarsh v. Cutting, io Johns. 360; Harris v. Carson, 7
Leigh, 632; Hawkins v. Skegg, io Humph. 3; Talbott v. Hill, 68 Ill. Io6;
Chandler v. Thurston, 1o Pick. 21o; Clark v. Rannie, 6 Lans. 2io; Reeder
v. Sayre, 7o N. Y. iSo, 185; Harris v. Frink, 49 N. Y. 24; Bain v. Clark, io
Johns. 424; Dircks v. Brant, 56 Md, 5oo. 3 Oland's Case, 5 Co. i6.
4 Cro. Eliz. 461 ; Co. Lit. 55, a; 2 Bla. Comm. 123, 145.
5 Debow v. Golfax, 1o N. J. L. r51.
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for the expense of ploughing and manuring the land, but
that-if the ouster took place after the crop was put in that
he was entitled to the emblements.,
An interesting question relating to the right of a tenant
to emblements, the tenancy being for an indefinite period,
was considered a few years ago by the Supreme Court of
Tennessee. In that case the plaintiff or tenant had sowed
on the land in November, 1872, a crop of English winter
oats, and had harvested the same in the following June. He
then ploughed in the stubble. so as to get another crop, which
was the custom. And this crop was growing in November,
1873, when he was compelled to leave the place. The de-
fendant cut and harvested the oats, and the plaintiff sued
in replevin, claiming that he was a tenant at will, and his
term having been terminated by his landlord, that he was
entitled to the growing crop as emblements. The question
was, therefore, whether the crop was of that character
secured to tenants in such cases. The court held it was not.
"When the tenancy is of uncertain duration and is termin-
ated by the landlord after the crop is sown, but before it is
severed from the freehold, the tenant or his representative
shall be entitled to one crop of that species only, which
ordinarily repays the labor by which it is produced within
the year within which that labor is bestowed, though the
crop may in extraordinary seasons be delayed beyond that
period. * * * If this second crop of oats had grown
without labor by the plaintiff, he would not have been en-
titled to it after the expiration of his term, as he had already
harvested the crop sown by him, and the additional labor
bestowed upon it does not change the result. * * *
Ploughing in the stubble, we think, is not equivalent to sow-
ing another crop, though it produce the same result."'2
While, as we have seen, the rule is that a tenant cannot
reap who plants a crop which he knows cannot mature until
after the termination of his tenancy, yet a custom that
' Bro. Abr., tit. Emblements, pl. 7 tit. Tenantjier cojlie de court roll, pl.
3. And see Stewart v,. Doughty, 9 Johns. ioS, 112.
2 Hendrickson v. Cardwell, 9 Baxt. 389.
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tenants, whether by parol or deed, shall have the way-going
crop after the expiration of their terms, is good. It was so
determined in the court of King's Bench as early as 1779, in
Wigglesworth v. Dallison.' The opinion of the court was
by Lord Mansfield, and was as follows: "We have thought
of this case, and we are all of opinion that the custom is
good. It is just, for he who sows ought to reap, and it is
for the benefit and encouragement of agriculture. It is, in-
deed, against the general rule of law concerning emble-
ments, which are not allowed to tenants who know when their
term is to cease, because it is held to be their fault or folly
to have sown, when they know their interest would expire
before they could reap. But the custom of a particular place
may rectify what otherwise would be imprudence or folly.
The lease being by deed does not vary the case. The cus-
tom does not alter or contradict the agreement in the lease,
it only superadds a right which is consequential to the tak-
ing, as a heriot may be due by custom, although not men-
tioned in the grant or lease." And such is the law in this
country. 2 In the same way it is held, that a custom that a
tenant may leave his way-going crop in the barns of the
farm for a certain time after the expiration of the lease and
his quitting the estate, is good.3 The way-going crop to
which the tenant is entitled under the above decisions is the
grain sown in the autumn before the expiration of the lease,
and which comes to maturity in the summer after the deter-
mination of the lease. But if he puts in the spring crop, as
oats, before he leaves, he is not entitled to gather it, but
I Douglas, 201. And see Boraston v. Green, 16 East, 71; Holding v.
Pigott, 7 Bing. 465.
2 Van Doren v. Everitt, 5 N. J. L. 460; Templeman v. Biddle, i Harr.
(Del.) 522; Stultz v. Dickey, 5 Binn. 285; Shaw v. Bowman, 91 Pa. St. 4i4;
Diffedorfer v. Jones, cited 5 Binn. 289; Biggs v,. Brown, 2 Serg. & R. 14;
Comfort v. Duncan, I Miles, 23! ; Derwie v. Bossler, i Pa. St. 224; Foster v.
Robinson, 5 Ohio St. go; Iddings v. Nagle, 2 Watts & S. 22; Lewis v,. Mc-
Natt, 65 N. C. 63; Dorsey v. Eagle, 7 Gill & J. 331. And see Reeder v.
Sayre, 7o N. Y. I8o, 185; Brown v. Parsons, 22 Mich. 28.
3 Lewis v,. Harris, cor. Skynner, C. B. Hereford, Sum. Assizes, 1778;
Beavan v. Delahay, i H. BI. 5; 3 Bac. Abr. 23 (Bouvier's Ed.).
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loses it, unless protected by an express contract.x In a case
decided in West Virginia in which the court conceded the
doctrine that where the lease was for a fixed period, and was
silent as to who was entitled to the way-going crop, the off-
going tenant would not be entitled to the crop, it was held
that where the lease recognized the right of the tenant to sow
in the last year of the term, he would have the right to reap
the way-going crop, the lease being silent as to who should
be entitled thereto.2
The rule is that one recovering in ejectment is entitled
not only to the soil, but to the crops growing on it and
constituting part of it.3 After judgment is obtained in
ejectment, the defendant is to be considered as a trespasser
from the date of the demise laid in the declaration. If he
has not harvested the crops he has no right to do so; and
if they have been harvested, the landlord, in an action for
mesne profits can recover their value.4 So, if a tenant
sows a crop during the pending of ejectment against his
landlord, and with notice of the pendency of the suit, he has
no right to enter after having surrendered the possession,
and cannot remove the crops so sown.5 And if the defend-
ant in ejectment, after execution of a writ of possession,
enters, cuts, and removes a crop, the plaintiff in ejectment
may recover its value from him in trover.6 But where one
sows, cultivates, and harvests a crop upon the land of another,
he is held to be entitled to the crops as against the owner
of the land, whether he came to the possession of the land
lawfully or not, provided he remained in possession until
the crop was harvested.7 While the owner may recover for
use and occupation, he can in no case be held to be the
owner of crops grown and actually harvested on the land
x Taylor's L. & T., 420, note 3 (6th ed.).
2 Kelley v. Todd, i W. Va. 197.
3 Rowell v. Klein, 44 Ind. 290, 295; McLean v. Bovell, 24 Wis. 295.
See Doe v. Witherwick, 3 Bing. ix.
4 Hodgson v. Gascoine, 5 Barn. & Aid. 88.
5 Rowell v. Klein, supra. 6 Altes v. Hinckler, 56 Ill. 275.
7 Adams v. Leip, 71 Mo. 597.
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by the defendant while in possession., And where one
purchases land of another, which had been planted' and
cultivated by a stranger without the grantor's consent, and
the stranger continued in possession and harvested the crop,
the grantee cannot sue for the value of the crop. For,
while the stranger would be liable for the use of the prop-
erty, the value of the crop would not be the measure of
damages.2 A person who settles on public land and plants
thereon a crop, cannot maintain trespass quare clausum
fiegitagainst one who thereafter purchases the land from the
government, and enters for the purpose of gathering and
converting such crop to his own use. As against such
vendee the trespasser has no remedy. The crop passes
with the land to the vendee.3 As between vendor and
vendee, growing crops are real estate, and unless removed,
pass to the purchaser by a deed of the land as being a part
of the freehold.4 And the rule is that the reservation of the
crops cannot vest in pkrol, but must be in writing.5
In an early case the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that growing grain did not pass to the vendee of the land,
on the ground that it was personal propdrty.6  But in 1838
the same court overruled that case, and placed itself in line
with adjudications elsewher.7 And while it is now held in
that State that growing crops will pass to the vendee of the
realty, yet it is held that a parol reservation of the crops
may be shown. "To confine a party," said Chief Justice
Black, "to the terms of a written agreement, from which
I Page v. Fowler, 39 Cal. 412.
Jenkins v. McCoy, 50 Mo. 348. 3 Floyd. v. Ricks, I4 Ark. 286.
4 Talbot v. Hill, 68 Ill. xo6; Powell v. Rich, 41 Ill. 466; Smith v. Price,
39 Ill. 28; Bull v. Griswold, ig Ill. 631; Gibbons v. Dillinghamton, 5 Eng.
9; Floyd v. Ricks, 14 Ark. 286, 291; Forte v. Calvin, 3 Johns. 222; Crews
v. Pendleton, i Leigh, 305; Hancock v. Caskey, 8 S. C. 282; Porche v.
Bodin, 28 La. An. 761; Jones v. Thomas, 8 Blackf. 428 ; Pitts V. Hendrix,
6 Ga. 452.
5 Powell v. Rich, 41 111.466; Smith v. Price, 39 Ill. 28; Dixon v. Nichols,
39 Ill. 372; Austin v. Sawyer, 9 Cowen, 39; Wintermute v. Light, 46 Barb.
.283; McIlvaine v. Harris, 20 Mo: 457; Brown v. Thurston, 56 Me. z26.
6 Smith v. Johnson, i Penrose, 471.
7 Wilkins v. Vashbinder. 7 Watts, 378.
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an, important part of the actual bargain is omitted at the
request of the other party, and on his solemn assurance that
it shall be performed, though not inserted, is such a fraud as
the jurisprudence of no civilized country will tolerate. The
evidence was admissible beyond a doubt. The vendor was
entitled to relief in equity, though not perhaps under the
head of mistake."'I
In Ohio, the courts have held that the reservation of the
crop may be shown by parol evidence, as between vendor
and vendee. "However little favor should be shown.," said
Mr. Justice Worden, "to reservations made by the vendor
by parol, when he is in possession, there must be some such
reservations which are valid. It is, in such instances, a
question of intent. When that intent relates to things
which may sometimes be treated as realty and sometimes
as personalty, the evidence of its manifestation in the con-
duct of the parties, or in their words at the date of the
deed, does not seem to alter, enlarge, or limit their written
contract. For, as already observed, that contract does not
necessarily embrace such things.2 But that court holds
that a parol reservation of trees, which were the spontaneous
growth of the land, would be inadmissible, inasmuch as they
were not raised by labor for the purposes of trade, and
could not be levied on as personalty even with the consent
of the owner of the land.3
A question has "been raised as to whether any distinction
is to be made between ripe and unripe crops standing
unharvested at the time of conveyance. Such a distinction
seems to have been taken in Illinois, where the court
declared as follows: "It has been uniformly held that by
a conveyance of land, without a reservation in a deed, the
crops and all things depending upon the soil for sustenance
belong to and pass with the land. After the crops have
matured, however, it is otherwise; but until they are ma-
tured they constitute such an interest in real estate as to
Lauchner v. Rex, 20 Pa. St. 464.
2 Baker v. Jordan, 3 Ohio St. 438 (1854). Followed in Youmans v.
Thomas, 4 Ohio St. 76, 79. 3 Jones v. Timmons, 21 Ohio St. 6o5.
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bring them within the Statute of Frauds. And to pass by
a sale by the owner of the soil, it must be evidenced by a
written agreement; or, if reserved from the operation of a
conveyance, it must be in writing." I If the court meant, in
the language above quoted, to express an opinion that ripe,
but unharvested, crops would not pass by a conveyance
of the realty, the opinion can only be regarded as an obiter
dictum, for it was by no means essential to the decision
of the case. The question, however, was fairly raised in a
case recently decided in the Supreme Court of Iowa, and
the conclusion reached was, that matured crops, ready for
the harvest, but not actually severed from the soil, did not
pass by a sheriff's deed, executed upon a foreclosure sale.2
As the subject is one of importance, and the authorities in
point are few, it is well to notice the reasons upon which
the conclusions of the court were supported. The court
said: "The grain being mature, the course of vegetation
has ceased, and the soil is no longer necessary for its exist-
ence. The connection between the grain and the ground
has changed. The grain no longer demands nurture from
the soil. The ground now performs no other office than
affording a resting-place for the grain. It has the same
relations to the grain that the warehouse has to the threshed
grain, or the field has to the stacks of grain thereon. It
will not be denied that when the grain is cut-it ceases to be
a part of the realty. The act of cutting it, it is true, appears
to sever the straw from the land. But it is demanded by
the condition of the grain. It is no longer growing. It is
no longer living blades, which require the nourishment of
the soil for its existence and development. It is changed
in its nature from growing blades of barley or oats to grain
mature and ready for the reaper. Now, the mature grain is
not regarded by the law like the growing blades, as a part
of the realty, but as grain in a condition of separation from
the soil. * * * There is no valid reason why the act
' Powell v. Rich, 4 Ill. 466.
2 Hecht v. Dittman, 2o Am. L. Reg. (N. s.) 6x5.
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of cutting should change the property in the grain. * * *
We think the ownership of the grain should be determined
by its condition, not by the act of cutting, which cannot be
done as soon as it is demanded by its condition." In
arriving at its conclusion, the court evidently overlooked
the fact that the same question had been previously raised
in the Supreme Court of Michigan, in a case in which a
directly opposite conclusion was reached., The question
there raised was whether a crop of corn standing on the
premises in December, the date of the deed, passed with
the land. And the court held that the question could no
more depend upon the maturity or immaturity of the crop,
than the passage of a standing forest tree, by a conveyance
of the land, would depend upon whether the tree was living
or dead. Stress was laid on the fact that the question
of severance could be ascertained with certainty, while the
fact of the maturity of the rop would be determined in
many cases with great difficulty. "It is true," said the
court, "that the authorities in alluding to this subject gen-
erally use the words 'growing crops,' as those embraced by
a conveyance of the land; but this expression appears to
have been commonly employed to distinguish crops still
attached to the ground, rather than to mark any distinction
between ripe and unripe crops." Thus the question stands
at the present time, and future adjudications must deter-
mine, as between these conflicting cases, which of them
laid down the rule which ought to govern in such contro-
versies. It is to be remarked, however, that so far as the
Statute of Frauds is concerned, it has been laid down that
a sale of standing crops, fructus industriales, is not a sale
of an interest in land, within the meaning of the fourth
section of that statute, without respect to the maturity or
immaturity of the crop.2 It is difficult to see why the same
principle should not be applicable in both cases.
' Tripp z. Hascilg, 20 Mich. 254.
2 Jones v. Flint, io Ad. & E. 753; Buck v. Pickwell, 27 Vt. 57, 163;
Carson v. Browder, 2 Lea, 701.
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When there is a parol contract for the sale of lands, and
under such contract the vendee, with the consent of the ven-
dor, enters into possession of the land and puts in crops, the
question arises whether the invalidity of the contract to sell
and convey affects the title of the vendee to the crops, pro-
vided the vendor refuses to perform, repudiates the contract,
and ejects the vendee from the land. Such a question arose
in the Supreme Court of New York," in a case where the
vendor had ejected the vendee and harvested the crop.
That court was of opinion that the vendee could not main-
tain an action against the vendor for taking the crop, and a
nonsuit was accordingly granted on the ground that the crop
was part of the realty, and that the vendee having no legal
title to the land, could have none to the crop. But the
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, declaring that
"the invalidity of the parol agreement to sell and convey
the land, did not affect the plaintiff's title to the crop. If
the agreement had remained executory in all its parts, of
course, none of its stipulations could have been separately
enforced, though if standing alone they might have been
valid. But although, by reason of the entirety of the con-
tract, the plaintiff could not have enforced the stipulation
allowing him to possess and work the farm, so long as it
remained executory, yet after it had been so far executed
that the cropdhad been sown and was growing, the invalidity'
of the other provisions of the contract, under the Statute of
Frauds, could not be invoked by the party who refused to
complete, as against the party not in default, for the purpose
of invalidating that part of the contract which had been
executed, and divesting the plaintiff's title to the crop raised
in pursuance of it." 2
In a case r~cently decided in Missouri, it is held that the
courts will take judicial notice that certain crops mature at.
certain seasons -in that case, that corn was mature in De-
cember.3 And so in Arkansas judicial notice was taken that
' Harris v. Frink, : Lans. 35. 2 Harris v. Frink, 49 N. Y. 29.
3 Garth v. Caldwell, 72 Mo. 6i2.
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a crop of corn could not have matured by the ioth of
August., But in Illinois it is held that the courts will not
take judicial notice of the time when crops of wheat, barley,
and oats mature. The reason given for the ruling was the
fact that the time for those crops to mature varied greatly
in the different parts of that State, and even in the same
locality.2
HENRY WADE ROGERS.
Floyd v. Ricks, 14 Ark. 286. 2 Dixon v. Niccolls, 39 Ill. 373.
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